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 Highlights 
 
 
 
- Suitable rules were proposed for identifying cases within sero-surveillance results 
- Equine arteritis virus is circulating in French breeding stock 
- 177 outbreaks were detected in the French breeding stock between 2006 and 2013 
- Sensitivity of the French breeding stock surveillance estimated at 82% (CI95 71-91) 
- 15% of cases in French brood mares between 2006 and 2013 were probably re-infected 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Equine viral arteritis (EVA) may have serious economic impact on the equine industry. For this 
reason, it is monitored in many countries, especially in breeding stock, to avoid its spread during 
breeding activities. In France, surveillance is mainly based on serological tests, since mares are not 
vaccinated, but difficulties in interpreting certain series of results may impair the estimation of the 
number of outbreaks.  
In this study, we propose specific rules for identifying seroconversion in order to estimate the 
number of outbreaks that were detected by the breeding stock surveillance component (BSSC) in 
France between 2006 and 2013. A consensus among multidisciplinary experts was reached to 
consider seroconversion as a change in antibody titer from negative to at least 32, or as an eight-fold 
or greater increase in antibody level. Using these rules, 239 cases and 177 outbreaks were 
identified. Subsequently, we calculated the BSSC’s sensitivity as the ratio of the number of detected 
outbreaks to the total number of outbreaks that occurred in breeding stock (including unreported 
outbreaks) estimated using a capture-recapture model. The total number of outbreaks was estimated 
at 215 (95% credible interval 195-249) and the surveillance sensitivity at 82% (CrI95% 71-91).  
Our results confirm EVA circulation in French breeding stock, show that neutralizing antibodies 
can persist up to eight years in naturally infected mares and suggest that certain mares have been 
reinfected. This study shows that the sensitivity of the BSSC is relatively high and supports its 
relevance to prevent the disease spreading through mating.  
 
Keywords:  equine viral arteritis; seroconversion; breeding stock; surveillance; epidemiology; 
surveillance sensitivity; capture-recapture; Bayesian inference.  
1. Introduction 
Equine viral arteritis (EVA) is an equine respiratory and reproductive disease, caused by equine 
arteritis virus (EAV), which can lead among other clinical signs to abortions and neonatal deaths 
(Pronost et al., 2010; Timoney, 2011). EAV belongs to the Arteriviridae family, order Nidovirales 
and infects equids only. EAV is an enveloped virus with a positive single stranded RNA genome 
and has been originally described in 1953, after an abortion outbreak in the city of Bucyrus, Ohio. 
EAV is usually transmitted horizontally by aerosols or venereal contact, including frozen semen. 
Vertical transmission through infection in utero and occasional indirect transmission by fomites 
may also occur. Following infection up to 70% of stallions will carry the virus in their reproductive 
tract and will shed the virus in their semen. Those stallions are the reservoirs of EAV and can 
transmit the virus to mares during breeding, even in absence of clinical signs (Balasuriya et al., 
2013; Timoney and McCollum, 1993).  
Due to its economic impacts, EVA is one of the most frequently monitored equine diseases in many 
countries (Chirnside, 1992; Hans and Marcé, 2012; Newton et al., 1999). In France, the EVA 
surveillance system comprises several components, including the surveillance of breeding stock, i.e. 
brood mares and stallions (Amat et al., 2015). The aim of this surveillance component is to ensure 
that horses remain free of infection during breeding activities to avoid any spread of the disease 
either by airborne or venereal routes.  
Over the last ten years, a few carrier stallions per year have been detected through assays based on 
virus detection in France (Hans and Marcé, 2012). More cases of infection, identified as 
seroconversions, have been identified by serological tests in mares, but their exact number remains 
unknown because there is no global data analysis. Moreover, some infected holdings remain 
undetected because the interpretation of some serological results may be difficult and because not 
all breeding horses are tested. Hence, the total number of EVA outbreaks—and thus EVA 
incidence—in the overall breeding stock population is not precisely known (Hans and Marcé, 
2012). 
Such incomplete detection of infected units is a recurrent issue in the field of disease surveillance. 
Capture-recapture methods are often advocated to address this matter because they give an 
estimation of the total number of infected units, whether or not they have been detected (Hook and 
Regal, 1995; Vergne et al., 2015). The sensitivity of the surveillance system or component, i.e. its 
ability to detect infected units, can then be estimated by the ratio of the number of infected units 
detected to the total number of infected units estimated.  
Our first objective was to establish suitable rules for identifying seroconversion in order to estimate 
the number of EVA cases and outbreaks that were detected by the equine breeding stock 
surveillance component (BSSC) in France between 2006 and 2013. The second objective was to 
estimate the sensitivity of this surveillance component, by estimating the total number of outbreaks 
that occurred in breeding stock during this period (including those that were not reported) using a 
capture-recapture model. 
 
2. Material and methods 
2.1. Breeding stock surveillance 
The BSSC is managed by both public authorities, i.e. the French institute for horse and riding 
(IFCE), and equine industry, i.e. the studbooks (Amat et al., 2015). Depending on their breed and 
sex, certain breeding horses must be tested annually before the stud season, according to the 
regulations and the studbooks’ code of practice. Surveillance is only mandatory for mares 
producing racehorse foals, i.e. Thoroughbred (TB), French Chaser (FC) and a part of Arabian horse 
(AR), Anglo-Arabian (AA) and French Saddle Horse (FS) mares. Surveillance is mandatory for 
around 20 breeds for the stallions used for natural mating, and for all breeds for the stallions used 
for semen collection, regardless of breed (IFCE, 2015a). There are around 40,000 breeding stock 
holdings in France, totaling some 8,000 stallions and 80,000 mares (IFCE, 2015b). Yet only around 
7,000 holdings are monitored for EVA each year, with around 3,000 stallions and 10,000 mares 
actually tested. The 10,000 tested mares are located in around 6,000 of these holdings, spread over 
2,000 communes. Between 2006 and 2013, the annual number of tested mares ranged from 9,777 to 
10,867, while the annual number of communes with at least one tested mare ranged from 1,794 to 
2,343. More than 40% of these communes are located in the three northwest regions of the country 
(Basse-Normandie, Pays-de-la-Loire and Bretagne) which keep the greatest number of holdings 
(B. Ferry, X. Dornier and S. Vinatier, personal communication). 
A serological test is used for surveillance purposes. This viral neutralization test (VNT), performed 
on a blood sample, is the current standard test for EVA prescribed by the OIE, the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE, 2013). The VNT, considered as the gold standard test for 
EVA diagnosis, detects the presence of neutralizing antibodies which persist for several years after 
natural infection (Timoney and McCollum, 1993). Stallions are often vaccinated in France with an 
inactivated EVA vaccine (Artervac®, Zoetis Animal Health Inc., Kalamazoo, Michigan, USA) but 
mares are not (B. Ferry, personal communication). We were very confident in the assumption that 
mares are not vaccinated, based on our knowledge as well as the answers given by the breeders, 
professionals from racehorse industry and people used to check passport of brood mares before 
mating activities. Given that VNT may detect antibodies produced after both infection and 
vaccination and that only stallions may carry the virus more than a few weeks after infection, the 
status of brood mares for EAV is only based on VNT results, while, in the event of a positive VNT 
result in stallions, tests based on virus detection by virus isolation or reverse transcriptase-
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) are performed on a semen sample in order to check for virus 
shedding and to confirm the case. All data related to breeding stock testing (including the test date, 
result, method, horse identification and location) are collected by the IFCE and held in ‘SIRE’, its 
national database. 
 
2.2. Data 
Data recorded in the SIRE database were used for analysis. We extracted data related to all breeding 
horses having at least one positive serological result using VNT between January 2006 and 
December 2013. These data included the horse identification number, location, dates and results of 
laboratory analyses (VNT) for EVA. We did not use data pertaining to stallions because the number 
of males with at least one positive result by VNT was very low (n=32) compared to mares 
(n=1,645) and some had uninterpretable results. The low number of seropositive stallions recorded 
in the SIRE database during this period is probably partly due to stringent health protection 
measures applied regarding stallions, which prevent them from infection (especially through 
airborne viral transmission), as well as the low number of movements and low level of mixing with 
other horses. Moreover, vaccinated -and some unvaccinated- stallions are monitored using tests 
based on virus detection and not VNT. Last, cases detected through epidemiological investigations 
(and not routinely by the BSSC) were not considered in this study.  
Only 28 out of 8,934 VNT results recorded for mares were classified as uninterpretable by the 
laboratory and excluded from the analysis (0.3 per cent). The location was recorded as the 
commune of the holding, which is registered at the beginning of each year.  
 
2.3. Case definition 
For each year, we were interested in the detection of (new) cases. A case was defined as a mare 
with seroconversion, detected by the interpretation of several VNT results for the same mare.  
Due to the difficulties in the interpretation of certain series of titers, a panel of four experts was 
specially gathered for this study to establish suitable rules for identifying seroconversion. The 
chosen experts were specialists in the disease and its laboratory diagnosis, as well as 
epidemiologists.  
 
2.4. Outbreak definition 
An outbreak was defined as a commune where at least one EVA case occurred within one year. We 
chose the commune because it is the smallest administrative unit provided by the SIRE database for 
the mares’ location, given that no list of holdings was available. The commune is the smallest 
French administrative unit, with a median area of 10.7 km2 and an interquartile range of [6.4:18.3] 
km2 (IGN, 2015). There are 36,552 communes in France (INSEE, 2011). For each mare, a 
commune is recorded in SIRE for each year within which at least one VNT is performed, so from 
one year to the other, several communes may appear for the same mare if it has been moved. If 
cases were identified in the same commune in different years, we considered that there were two 
separate outbreaks, i.e. two separate infected “communes-years”. 
Given that the breeding season starts in February each year, a VNT is usually performed in the first 
few months of the year (i.e. 82% of tests are performed before the end of April). We therefore 
assumed that if seroconversion is detected during a given year y, the infection occurred during the 
previous year, y-1. Hence, we took into account the location of year y-1 when counting the number 
of new EVA cases in each outbreak. If the commune was not recorded for year y-1, we took into 
account years y-2 or y-3. The dataset included the results of annual serological tests performed 
between January 2006 and December 2013. Identification of seroconversion needs comparison of 
several results. Thus, annual results of 2006 cannot be interpreted alone to identify cases but they 
allow to detect seroconversions between 2007 and 2013. Since we assumed that infection occurred 
the year preceding the identification of seroconversion, our data allowed us to detect infections that 
occurred between 2006 and 2012. Consequently, the number of outbreaks was estimated only for 
the seven-year period from 2006 to 2012. 
 
2.5. Capture-recapture method 
Once the distribution of EVA outbreaks that were observed or “captured” by the BSSC is known, 
the total number of outbreaks (or infected communes-years) Ninf can be estimated using a capture-
recapture model. Capture-recapture models are often used to estimate the number of undetected 
units of interest by modeling multiple detections of each detected unit. In epidemiology, depending 
on the number of data sources, two capture-recapture approaches can be used: multilist and unilist 
approaches (Vergne et al., 2015). While multilist capture-recapture methods are relevant when 
infected units can be detected by several surveillance systems or components, unilist methods focus 
on the frequency of detection of infected units by a single source (“one list”) of observations 
(Bronner et al., 2013; Chao et al., 2001; Del Rio Vilas and Böhning, 2008; Vergne et al., 2012). In 
this study, a unilist capture-recapture approach was used with the detection source being the 
surveillance component targeting the breeding stock. The frequency of detection of each outbreak 
was the number of infected horses detected in each outbreak by the BSSC. An outbreak could either 
be captured once or more (if one or more infected mares were detected) or not captured (if no 
infected mares were detected).  
Let Yi be the number of infected mares detected in outbreak i. We assumed that Yi was distributed 
according to a binomial distribution of parameters ni and π, with ni being the number of mares that 
were tested in each outbreak and π being the probability that a tested mare was identified as a case. 
Therefore, the number of tested mares ni was included as a ‘binomial denominator’ corresponding 
to the maximum number of cases that could be detected in an outbreak (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2013; Hothorn and Everitt, 2014). The number of tested mares was extracted from the SIRE 
database for each outbreak and ranged from 1 to 109, with a mean of 15.7 and a median of 7. A 
tested mare is detected as a case if it is infected and if its infection is detected. Therefore, the 
probability π that a tested mare was identified as a case was decomposed as the product of Inc, the 
incidence rate within an outbreak, and SeR, the sensitivity of the proposed rules (SeR accounts for 
the sensitivity of the test). Because the number of outbreaks where zero infected mares were 
detected is unknown, the observed distribution of the number of infected mares per outbreak 
follows a zero-truncated binomial distribution, that is: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖 > 0, 𝑛𝑖 , 𝐼𝑛𝑐, 𝑆𝑒𝑅) =
𝑛𝑖!
𝑦𝑖!(𝑛𝑖−𝑦𝑖)!
(𝐼𝑛𝑐∗𝑆𝑒𝑅)𝑦𝑖(1−𝐼𝑛𝑐∗𝑆𝑒𝑅)𝑛𝑖−𝑦𝑖
1−(1−𝐼𝑛𝑐∗𝑆𝑒𝑅)𝑛𝑖
,  (1) 
with yi being the number of infected mares detected in outbreak i and ni the number of tested mares 
in outbreak i. Parameters Inc and SeR were estimated in a Bayesian framework using the WinBUGS 
software (Spiegelhalter et al., 2003). To specify the zero-truncated distribution we used the zero-
trick, as proposed by Spiegelhalter et al., which is often used to specify sampling distributions that 
are not included in the list of standard distributions in WinBUGS (Spiegelhalter et al., 2003). To 
determine the prior distributions of Inc and SeR, an expert opinion elicitation was conducted based 
on the same expert panel as mentioned above. Using EpiTools software1, priors were defined as 
beta distributions whose mode and 5th percentile were the average most likely and the smallest 5th 
percentile values determined from the panel elicitation. Priors for Inc and SeR were therefore beta 
distributions of parameters (4.6, 9.3) and (44.9, 11.3), respectively. To determine the posterior 
distributions, we ran three simulation chains of 10,000 iterations, and discarded the first 2,000 
iterations of each chain to allow for burn-in of the chains. Chains were then thinned, taking every 
fifth sample to reduce autocorrelation amongst the samples. Convergence was assessed by checking 
the trace plots for all monitored parameters.  
We then used the posterior distributions of Inc and SeR and the number of tested mares in the 
detected outbreaks to estimate the total number of outbreaks Ninf and the BSSC’s sensitivity SeB. To 
do so, we assumed 1) that the number of cases amongst the tested mares in outbreak i (Ci) followed 
a zero-truncated binomial distribution of parameters ni and Inc, since all brood mares were tested so 
that there was at least one infected mare tested in each outbreak i, and 2) that the number of 
detected cases in outbreak i (Yi) followed a binomial distribution of parameters Ci and SeR. For each 
                                                            
1 http://epitools.ausvet.com.au/ 
detected outbreak, we calculated analytically the probability Pr(Yi=0) that no infected mare was 
detected in that outbreak. For each outbreak i, this probability is obtained by summing the 
probabilities that Yi=0 for all possible values of Ci, that may range from 1 to ni the number of tested 
mares in outbreak i: 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 0) = ∑ Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 0⋂𝐶𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖)
𝑛𝑖
𝐶𝑖=1
 (2) 
Using the Bayes theorem, equation (2) becomes: 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 0) = ∑ {Pr⁡(𝑌𝑖 = 0|𝐶𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖)
𝑛𝑖
𝐶𝑖=1
∗ Pr⁡(𝐶𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖)} (3) 
Using parameters Inc, SeR and ni, the probability of not detecting the outbreak i can be calculated as 
follows: 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 0) = ∑ {(1 − 𝑆𝑒𝑅)
𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑐𝑖=1
∗
𝑛𝑖!
𝑐𝑖!∗(𝑛𝑖−𝑐𝑖)!
∗𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑖∗(1−𝐼𝑛𝑐)𝑛𝑖−𝑐𝑖
1−(1−𝐼𝑛𝑐)𝑛𝑖
},  (4) 
with Inc the incidence rate within an outbreak, SeR the sensitivity of the proposed rules and ni the 
number of tested mares in outbreak i. The probability Pr(Yi=0) for each detected outbreak was 
calculated in WinBUGS using ni and the posterior distribution of SeR and Inc. Assuming that the 
distributions of the number of tested mares in the detected and non-detected outbreaks are the same, 
the total number of EVA outbreaks was estimated using an extension of the Horvitz-Thompson 
estimator proposed by van der Heijden and colleagues (Van der Heijden et al., 2003): 
𝑁𝑖𝑛?̂? =⁡∑
1
1−Pr⁡(𝑌𝑖=0)
𝑁𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝑖=1  ,  (5) 
with Nobs being the number of detected outbreaks.  
Then, the surveillance sensitivity (SeB) was defined as the proportion of outbreaks detected by the 
BSSC among all infected communes that kept at least one brood mare tested for EVA, i.e. used to 
produce racehorse foals. It was estimated by dividing the number of detected outbreaks (Nobs) by the 
estimate of the total number of EVA outbreaks that occurred between 2006 and 2012 (𝑁𝑖𝑛?̂? ).  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Proposed rules for identification of seroconversion 
The expert panel ascertained that changes in antibody titer in the same animal can be due to either 
recent infection/re-infection or other reasons, such as slight differences in laboratory practices. 
Since mares are not vaccinated in France, vaccination was not retained as a possible reason for titer 
increase for this study. Although a recent infection usually imply a much greater increase in 
antibody titer than for other reasons (Go et al., 2012), it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
between these situations, and we did not find any accurate description in the scientific literature of 
the antibody titer curve over time in horses naturally infected with EVA. 
First of all, the panel studied dozens of titer series taken from the dataset and two kinds of cases 
were distinguished. The first case is a change in antibody titer from negative to positive and the 
second, an increase in the titer for animals with previous positive results. In the first case, several 
profiles were identified (Fig. 1). Many mares exhibit negative initial results followed by positive 
ones only (see solid line ‘mare 1’ in Fig. 1). Thus, seroconversion is easily identified for such cases. 
Surprisingly, certain mares had negative results, then positive ones, then negative result(s) again, 
and even sometimes positive results yet again. In a few cases, a single negative result appears 
among a series of high titers and is likely an error, probably due to a data entry mistake (see ‘mare 
2’ in Fig. 1). But in many cases, mares gave a mix of negative and low positive results with 
antibody titers ranging from four to eight (and even 16). This is likely to occur when a non-
vaccinated mare has been infected not recently but many months or years ago (see ‘mare 3’ in Fig. 
1). However, between these situations (mares 1 and 2 versus 3 ), a moderate rise in antibody titers 
may also occur, casting doubt about recent seroconversion.  
 
In the second case, the expert panel tried to identify a sharp rise in the antibody titer of animals with 
positive initial results, which can be the consequence of reinfection (Balasuriya and MacLachlan, 
2004). Among mares included in the 2006-2013 dataset with a positive initial result, several profiles 
were identified. For certain mares, a sharp rise in antibody titer was observed, for instance from 16 
to 1024, consistent with recent reinfection (see ‘mare 4’ in Fig. 1). But in most cases, the first 
positive result is followed by lower, identical or slightly higher antibody titers (see ‘mare 5’ in Fig. 
1). For these mares, the infection probably occurred several months/years ago and the antibody titer 
may decrease or vary around low (‘mare 3’) or high values (‘mare 5’). Once more, moderate 
increases in antibody titers may sow doubt about recent reinfection. Interestingly, VNT results 
showed that neutralizing antibodies can persist up to eight years in naturally infected mares. 
 
 
 
The panel then studied the possible reasons for fluctuations in the antibody titer that differs from a 
recent infection. According to the National Reference Laboratory (NRL) who regularly perform and 
organize proficiency tests with the French laboratory network approved by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the antibody titer may vary a little in a horse infected many months or years ago and 
regularly tested. This variation usually ranges from one titer below to one titer higher than a central 
“true” value. In this way, titers from a horse with a constantly high antibody level is likely to vary 
along a four-fold scale, for instance from 64 to 256, and a horse with a constant but low antibody 
level usually has titers ranging from “zero” (negative result) to eight. Greater variations appear 
unlikely. 
For this research, seroconversion was finally defined by the panel as a change in antibody titer from 
negative to at least 32, or as an eight-fold or greater increase in antibody level in mares with 
previous positive results (from 16 to at least 128, for instance). Seroconversion was thus identified 
by comparing results from two or more successive years, given that mares can be not tested during 
one year and since detection of a sharp increase in antibody level can sometimes take two years as 
tests are annually performed. Indeed, the increase in antibody level can still be very weak when a 
mare is tested just after infection, thus the seroconversion could be definitely detected only the 
following year. 
In order to investigate the sensitivity of our results to the seroconversion definition, we compared 
the estimated BSSC’s sensitivity with the estimate obtained by using another plausible definition, 
i.e. considering also the change in antibody titer from negative to 16 or 24 as a seroconversion. This 
alternative definition is more sensitive but less specific than the one used in this study. 
 
3.2. Number of EVA cases and outbreaks detected by the BSSC 
By applying the ad hoc rules established for identifying seroconversion, we observed 239 EVA 
cases in the 2006-2013 SIRE dataset that had been detected in brood mares by the BSSC (Fig. 2). 
The holding’s commune was not available for three of these mares, which were subsequently 
excluded.  
 
Thoroughbred mares represent the largest proportion of EVA cases detected by the BSSC (Table 1). 
Of the 236 mares with a known location, all but one belonged to the five breeds previously quoted. 
The one exception was a riding horse of unknown breed. 
 
For the 236 EVA cases with a known location, we counted the number of cases within each 
commune, considering each year separately. In respectively 85 and 14% of cases, the commune for 
years y-1 and y-2 was used, and we had to go back as far as year y-3 for only less than 2% of cases 
(four mares). Finally, 177 outbreaks or infected communes-years were identified (Table 2). For 
most outbreaks, only one case was detected, while the maximum number of cases detected per 
outbreak was 30.  
 
Using the alternative seroconversion definition mentioned above (including change in antibody titer 
from negative to at least 16, in addition to an eight-fold or greater increase in antibody level), we 
observed 304 cases in 235 outbreaks detected by the BSSC between 2006 and 2013. 
 3.3. Estimation of the total number of EVA outbreaks in breeding stock and of the BSSC’s 
sensitivity 
The posterior distributions of Inc, the incidence rate within the outbreaks, SeR, the sensitivity of the 
proposed rules for identifying seroconversion, Ninf, the total number of outbreaks and SeB, the 
BSSC’s sensitivity, are summarized in Table 3 using their median and their 95% credible interval 
(CrI95%), which are the intervals containing 95% of the posterior values. According to the model, 
the total number of EVA outbreaks (𝑁𝑖𝑛?̂? ) was estimated at 215 (CrI95% 195-249) between 2006 
and 2012, on average around 31 per year (CrI95% 28-36). During this seven-year period, 177 
outbreaks were detected by the surveillance system. Thus the overall sensitivity of the BSSC 
pertaining to communes having at least one mare used for the production of racehorse foals (𝑆𝑒?̂?) 
was estimated at 82% (CrI95% 71-91) (Table 3). 
 
Using the alternative seroconversion definition, the total number of EVA outbreaks during the same 
period appeared to be greater at 287 (CrI95% 260-334). However, the change in the posterior 
distribution of the BSSC’ sensitivity was very limited, i.e. SeB was estimated at 82% (CrI95% 70-
90). Moreover, there were no significant changes in the posterior distributions of the incidence rate 
within the outbreaks (median at 3.5%, CrI95% 2.7-4.6) and the sensitivity of the proposed rules for 
identifying seroconversion (median at 79%, CrI95% 66-88). 
 
4. Discussion  
 
4.1. Rules defined for identifying seroconversion  
For international trade of horses, the rules defined by the Terrestrial animal health code of the OIE 
(OIE, 2015) have to be strictly applied. However for the purpose of this study, we have decided to 
use the ad hoc rules previously defined in order to identify the number of seroconversions in the 
SIRE dataset since i) we did not find accurate information in the literature about the level of the 
serological response in naturally infected horses over several years and ii) the proposed rules seem 
appropriate to distinguish between recent cases and mares infected several years ago, regarding the 
SIRE dataset.  
It has been shown that neutralizing antibodies are detected within 1-2 weeks following infection, 
peak at 2-4 months and persist for years thereafter (Balasuriya and MacLachlan, 2004), but we did 
not find any comprehensive description of the antibody titer curve several months or years after 
infection. As seen in the SIRE’s dataset, it was difficult to find an obvious cut-off point to 
distinguish new cases. The rules defined in this study are probably imperfect and there was no “gold 
standard” test available in order to check their relevance. The choice of not considering a change in 
antibody titer from negative to 4, 8 or 16 (as well as a four-fold increase) as a case may appear strict 
compared to rules usually applied for import/export, mating agreements (Anonyme, 2014) or 
prevalence studies (Chirnside, 1992; Newton et al., 1999). Nevertheless, natural and experimental 
infections usually appear to involve high antibody titers, although serum neutralizing antibody 
response may depend on the virus strain and duration of this response may differ following 
experimental infection compared to natural infection or vaccination (Go et al., 2012; MacLachlan et 
al., 1998; Summers-Lawyer et al., 2011; Timoney et al., 2007).  
Although VNT seems the most reliable and relevant test for yearly surveillance of EVA in breeding 
stock, it is not always straightforward to identify true seroconversion. Slight variations in the 
antibody titer may lead to overestimate the number of cases, especially when antibody level is very 
low. Several laboratories have developed and evaluated enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays 
(ELISAs) and such serological tests could make it easier to identify seroconversion in the future 
(Balasuriya et al., 2013). Whichever serological test used, an important issue is to save the 
successive results from the same horse to be able to properly interpret future results. For 
epidemiological purposes, it is necessary to define ad hoc rules for identifying seroconversion, 
which may differ depending on the country, laboratory practices and test used. Some authors have 
also defined ad hoc algorithms for interpreting the antibody titer in the case of other infectious 
diseases (Premaratna et al., 2012). The rules defined in our study may be used for the overall 
epidemiological interpretation of data collected by other EVA surveillance components (such as 
testing before sales or movement and passive surveillance), while the application of the currently 
accepted guidelines for mating agreements and national and international trade of horses must be 
continued. Indeed, it is important to distinguish between epidemiological purposes, for instance 
estimating the annual incidence rate, and certification or policy purposes. For the latter purposes, it 
is prudent to continue considering that any four-fold or greater increase in VNT results or any 
change from negative to positive may be associated with a risk of spreading the disease (after 
infection or reinfection). This is especially relevant because the mating or import ban can generally 
be lifted in a few weeks, once a stable antibody titer—coinciding with viral clearance—has been 
obtained.  
 
4.2. Statistical framework 
For this study, a zero-truncated binomial distribution was preferred to a zero-truncated Poisson 
distribution to model the observed count data. Indeed, the Poisson distribution is a limiting case of 
the binomial distribution when a large number of trials or individuals is reached and the probability 
of success (i.e. probability that one tested animal is detected as being a case in our study) is small. 
However, when the binomial numerator is close to the value of the denominator, which is often the 
case here, the binomial model is usually preferable (Hilbe, 2011). Moreover, the binomial model is 
a recommended approach when there are only a few outbreaks with more than one or two cases 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2013), such as in the dataset we used. 
There are assumptions inherent in fitting a zero-truncated binomial model. In particular, it is 
assumed that observations are independent from each other. In other words, all infected horses shall 
have the same probability of being detected (Dohoo et al., 2010). As is often the case regarding 
livestock, this assumption may be violated here because horses are usually maintained in groups 
and the probability of detecting a case may vary from one group to another due to several factors 
such as farming practices. Moreover, heterogeneity in the probability of detection also arises at the 
commune scale. A commune with many cases is much more likely to be detected than one with 
only a few infected mares. This phenomenon is named “abundance-induced heterogeneity” in 
ecology (MacKenzie et al., 2006). Here, it would depend on many factors, including the number of 
horses within the commune, infection pressure, delay between virus introduction and testing, type 
of operation, and farming practices—such as the level of mixing within the herd and with animals 
from other herds, allowing virus transmission by respiratory and/or venereal routes (including 
mating, meetings and contact in pastures with neighboring herds). The number of cases within an 
outbreak may also vary due to the proportion of mares with durable immunity, built up after 
previous infection. The higher this proportion, the lower is the probability to detect the outbreak. 
Consequently, everything else being equal, the probability of detection is lower for communes 
previously (and quite recently) infected compared to communes who have never been infected. This 
phenomenon was probably quite common in this study and can partly explain the low estimate of 
the incidence rate within outbreaks, because more than 1,400 mares with stable or decreasing 
antibody titers with no evidence of seroconversion were detected in our dataset. The interaction of 
all these factors is likely to lead to considerable heterogeneity in the probability of detecting 
infected horses and communes. It would have been useful to include all these parameters as 
covariates within our model to better handle the heterogeneity, but only the number of tested mares 
within the commune was available.  
Non-parametric approaches can also be used when there is heterogeneity in count data. For 
instance, the Zelterman estimator (1988) and Chao’s lower bound estimator may estimate the total 
number of outbreaks using only the total number of detected outbreaks and the number of outbreaks 
detected once or twice, i.e. with one or two cases detected (Chao, 1987; Del Rio Vilas and Böhning, 
2008; Zelterman, 1988). However, because these approaches only use a small fraction of the 
available data (they only use the number of outbreaks detected once or twice and do not account for 
the number of tested mares in each outbreak), the parametric approach was preferred.  
 4.3. Number of cases and outbreaks detected by the BSSC 
We estimated that 239 new EVA cases and 177 outbreaks were detected by the BSSC between 2006 
and 2012 in brood mares. These numbers are not negligible and confirm that EVA was circulating 
in breeding stock during this period. It supports the relevance of EVA surveillance in breeding stock 
in order to identify cases and prevent the disease spreading through mating. This result could assist 
policy makers in their decisions on whether to extend active surveillance to other breeds and/or by 
other procedures, in addition to the other surveillance components implemented in France, i.e. 
compulsory and voluntary notification of suspicions, pre-sales surveillance and pre-export testing 
(Amat et al., 2015), in order to better estimate the incidence rate and better protect the equine 
population from EVA infection. Brood mares are not vaccinated and thus act as sentinels (Newton, 
2007), while other unvaccinated horse populations may also be useful in signaling new subclinical 
infections. 
Of the 239 cases, 35 mares (15%) had positive result(s) before showing a sharp increase in the 
antibody titer. Given that mares are not vaccinated in France, they were probably reinfected. To 
date, natural infection is generally recognized as resulting in durable immunity against reinfection 
with most if not all strains of the virus, but the possibility of reinfection has been assumed by 
certain authors (Balasuriya and MacLachlan, 2004). Moreover, 1,406 mares with at least one 
positive VNT result were detected during this period. These mares were probably infected before 
2006. The high proportion of these “old” cases compared to the proportion of new cases may be 
surprising, but this situation highlights the disease’s presence in breeding stock for a long time, with 
a significant number of cases even before the first major occurrence of EVA recorded in France in 
2007, characterized by numerous clinical cases and a few fatal cases in the north-western part of the 
country (Pronost et al., 2010). It was not possible to estimate the evolution of the incidence rate 
before and after 2006. Indeed, the VNT results for these 1,406 mares before 2006 as well as their 
dates of infection were not available.  
Most detected cases were TB, followed by FS and AA (Table 1). These breeds, in the same order, 
are those with the highest numbers of mares tested each year. Indeed, they represent around 78%, 
11% and 6% respectively of mares tested in 2012. For each of the five studied breeds, the average 
percentage of cases among tested mares was lower than 1% between 2006 and 2012. Nevertheless, 
the incidence rate for each breed was not estimated because it was not the aim of this study and it 
would have required specific calculation methods, given that our data must be considered to have 
been collected by a two-stage sampling process (sampling of the communes and then of the mares 
within the communes).  
 
4.4. Estimation of annual EVA incidence and the BSSC’s sensitivity 
We estimated the incidence by keeping all the years together in order to improve the statistical 
robustness of our result. During this seven-year period, around 6,000 holdings with brood mares in 
2,000 communes were tested for EVA each year due to mating activities. Thus, the yearly incidence 
rate at commune scale was estimated at around 1.6% for these 2,000 communes (or 0.1% 
considering all French communes). These estimates seem plausible when trying to compare them 
with other countries, although comparison is quite difficult for following reasons. Numerous studies 
have investigated the presence of EVA in various countries, but they have usually estimated 
serological point prevalence rather than annual incidence (i.e. the number of new cases or 
outbreaks), leading to higher values given that neutralizing antibodies persist several years. 
Moreover, sampling procedures applied in these studies were different. Some studies are based on 
surveys specifically carried out to assess prevalence (Braga et al., 2012; Chabchoub et al., 2002; 
Laabassi et al., 2014; NAHMS, 2000), while other studies have used actively collected samples in 
specific sub-populations or analyzed results from horses tested before mating, vaccination, import 
or export, or results from suspected cases (Chirnside, 1992; Newton et al., 1999). Furthermore, 
prevalence was usually investigated on an individual scale rather than holding or commune scale. 
EVA prevalence was estimated in several breeds, but farming practices vary largely from breed to 
breed and may influence both the risk of infection and prevalence. The most comparable results are 
the serological prevalence estimated in the same (racehorse) breeds and breeding stock. In the TB, 
individual prevalence has been estimated between 0.3% and 4.5% in the UK, Brazil, Algeria and 
the US during the last 20 years (Braga et al., 2012; Laabassi et al., 2014; NAHMS, 2000; Newton et 
al., 1999). In Arabian horses, prevalence has been estimated to range from 6.7% to 26% in Brazil, 
Algeria and Tunisia since 2000 (Braga et al., 2012; Chabchoub et al., 2002; Laabassi et al., 2014) 
(F. Laabassi, personal communication). Individual prevalence has been estimated at 5.6% (CI95% 
2.3-8.9) in breeding horses in the USA in 1998 (NAHMS, 2000). Lastly, one interesting result is the 
serological prevalence on a holding scale on breeding farms in the USA, estimated at 20.5% (CI95% 
5.8-35.2) in 1998 (NAHMS, 2000). All these results were calculated on the basis of horses without 
any history of vaccination against EVA. The higher prevalence found in breeding stock can be 
explained by a higher risk of infection due to the existence of two transmission routes: venereal and 
respiratory.  
The estimated BSSC’s sensitivity on a commune scale can be considered as quite high. However, 
the BSCC probably does suffer from a moderate lack of sensitivity. This could be due to the 
sampling process because only a fraction of the equine breeding stock is tested annually. This is 
why we focused our study on only the five most regularly tested breeds. Even for these five breeds, 
only around half of the brood mares are tested because the ones not used to produce racehorse foals 
do not need to be tested. However, almost all TB and FC brood mares are tested every year and, for 
other breeds, the holdings producing racehorse foals usually do not hold brood mares producing 
non-racehorse foals (and thus not tested). 
A slight lack of sensitivity in either the serological test or the data collection process may also be 
suspected. However, the VNT is very sensitive (OIE, 2013), and the quality of samples, notification 
procedures, data recording and reliability of the results have also been assessed as satisfactory 
(Amat et al., 2015). 
The rules defined for identifying seroconversion may also have affected the results, but moderate 
modifications in these rules did not induce a substantial change. Indeed, the use of a more sensitive 
and less specific seroconversion definition (i.e. also considering a change in antibody titer from 
negative to 16 as a seroconversion) leads to no significant difference in the estimated BSSC’s 
sensitivity. 
Although the BSSC’s sensitivity was estimated to be relatively high on a commune scale, it is likely 
to be as high on a holding scale, if not more. The result on a commune scale was obtained by 
dividing the number of detected infected communes by the estimated total number of infected 
communes between 2006 and 2012. The latter number is related to the probability π that one tested 
animal is detected as being a case, which is directly related to the number of tested mares in each 
unit, which is the commune. The commune was chosen because no more precise location was 
available, but each commune with brood mares tested for EVA contains three holdings on average. 
Consequently, using the commune scale may potentially lead to cases from several holdings being 
counted together, thus increasing the number of cases per unit (binomial numerator, Ci) compared 
to using the holding scale. However, the increase in the numerator is probably much smaller than 
the increase in the denominator (number of tested mares per unit, ni). Indeed, the venereal route is 
probably the main route of infection of breeding stock holdings compared with the airborne one and 
there were only a few communes with more than one detected case (19/177), so the presence of 
several infected holdings within the same commune was probably unusual. On the other hand, the 
presence of one or more EVA-free holdings in the same commune as an infected holding is 
probably more common, especially in the major breeding stock farming areas where the number of 
holdings in certain communes can be quite high. The potential overestimation of the denominator is 
supported by the fact that the average number of tested mares within each tested commune (4.7) is 
around three times higher than the average number of mares in general breeding farms (1.7) (IFCE, 
2015b). Moreover, even within the same holding, breeding horses are sometimes held in separate 
facilities without contact with each other, resulting in a low probability of the disease being 
transmitted from one batch of horses to another. Furthermore, all tested mares were counted in the 
denominator, including mares with stable or decreasing positive VNT results. As seen before these 
mares had probably been infected several years ago and built up durable immunity, and their 
presence has probably artificially increased the number of susceptible mares. 
Using a zero-truncated binomial model allowed us to take into account not only the detected cases 
and their clustering within communes, but also the number of tested mares in each commune. This 
enabled us to manage part of the heterogeneity in the probability of detecting cases and outbreaks. 
Including relevant covariates in the model (e.g. number of untested horses within the unit, number 
of risky contacts or primary function of the operation) could have potentially helped to account for 
the remaining observed heterogeneity. Unfortunately, such covariate information was not available 
and the small amount of data prevented the inclusion of several covariates. It would be useful to 
develop a model which correctly manages heterogeneity, but this is a difficult target to achieve. 
Taking heterogeneity into account vaguely or inexplicitly, such as using zero-truncated negative 
binomial or non-parametric models, may also be future avenues for research. 
 
Conclusions 
This study shows that the number of EVA cases and outbreaks is not negligible in the French 
breeding stock, and suggests that a proportion of brood mares have been reinfected, a situation 
which had not previously been documented to our knowledge. The estimate of the BSSC’s 
sensitivity between 2006 and 2012 was at 82% (CrI95% 71-91) which is relatively high. However, 
the sensitivity of EVA surveillance could be improved by a closer relationship between surveillance 
components and more detailed information about the horses’ location, which is necessary to 
improve numerous kinds of epidemiological research. Expanding access to serological results 
collected in circumstances other than pre-mating surveillance (especially before sales or 
international trade) and using common rules for identifying seroconversion would improve future 
incidence investigations, particularly because they would pave the way for multilist studies. 
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Fig. 1. Examples of equine viral arteritis antibody titer curves in five brood mares tested each year 
over an eight-year period.  
  
  
 
Fig. 2. Flow chart documenting the ad hoc rules used to identify equine viral arteritis cases among 
the brood mares tested between January 2006 and December 2013 in France using the viral 
neutralization test (VNT). 
  
Table 1. Number of equine viral arteritis (EVA) cases with a known location detected in mares by 
the French breeding stock surveillance component (BSSC) between 2006 and 2013 for each breed. 
Mare’s breed 
Thorough-
bred  
Arabian 
horse 
Anglo-
Arabian 
French 
Chaser 
French 
Saddle 
Other 
(riding 
horse) 
Total 
Number of EVA cases 
with a known location 
detected by the BSSC 
170 5 26 1 33 1 236 
 
  
 Table 2. Number of equine viral arteritis (EVA) cases detected in the outbreaks identified by the 
breeding stock surveillance component (BSSC) in French breeding stock between 2006 and 2013. 
Number of EVA cases detected 
per outbreak 
1 2 3 4 7 8 30 Total 
Number of outbreaks identified 
using the seroconversion 
definition proposed by the 
panel 
158 13 1 3 1 - 1 177 
Number of outbreaks identified 
using the alternative 
seroconversion definition 
209 18 3 3 - 1 1 235 
 
  
 Table 3. Incidence rate of equine viral arteritis (EVA) within outbreaks, sensitivity of the proposed 
rules for identifying seroconversion, total number of outbreaks in French breeding stock and 
sensitivity of the breeding stock surveillance component (BSSC) between 2006 and 2012 estimated 
using a zero-truncated binomial model. 
Estimated parameter Median 95% credible interval 
𝐼𝑛?̂? Incidence rate within outbreaks (%) 4.9 3.8-6.4 
𝑆𝑒?̂? 
Sensitivity of the proposed rules for 
identifying seroconversion (%) 
79 66-88 
𝑁𝑖𝑛?̂? Total number of EVA outbreaks 215 195-249 
𝑆𝑒?̂? BSSC’s sensitivity (%) 82 71-91 
 
 
